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Abstract 
This article looks to identify a political mode of audience engagement in the ‘one-on-one’ 
performance, Half Cut. In response to recent economic turbulence in the UK and abroad, I 
draw on Hans-Thies Lehmann’s appeal for an ‘aesthetics of risk’ in the theatre: an aesthetics 
which I suggest might begin at the level of audience reception. This marks a turn away from 
the more prevalent application of risk to artistic production. Couched in the sociological 
context of Ulrich Beck’s ‘risk society’, I compare risk-taking in contemporary financial 
markets with the apparently trivial and seemingly ‘risky’ act of paying to pluck a single hair 
from another’s body as a participant in Half Cut. I consider how affective responses such as 
embarrassment and awkwardness in one-on-one theatre (which might be felt as ‘risks’) 
function either as something masochistically consumed within the experience industry, or as 
positive values subversively premised on loss – such as loss of dignity and self-assuredness – 
provided that risk is not something passively submitted to, but actively committed to. The 
argument centres on an economically defined power dynamic operating between performer 
and participant, paying close attention to how the successful operation of this dynamic within 
the aesthetic space of Half Cut might lift an otherwise fetishised relationship into something 
felt through affectation.  I suggest that a triadic relationship between risk, agency and 
responsibility – which is perhaps broken in financial markets – is forged through a ‘dialogic 
intimacy’ between performer and participant, opening space for a radical engagement with 
risk beginning at the level of an existential queasiness.  
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Damocles and the Plucked: Audience Participation and Risk in Half Cut 
A young man in a clean-cut suit beckons me into a two metre by one metre room: to the left, a 
sink with fragrances and hand creams; to the right, a price list and stick-man diagram 
illustrating a graded system of plucking, waxing or shaving hair from a model’s body. 
‘Pluck’, I say, and hand over the designated pound. Ushered into an adjacent room, I find 
myself facing another young man, good-looking, with a wide, beaming grin. We are alone. 
His only clothing is a pair of small black boxer shorts (Emporio Armani). ‘Hello’, he says. A 
‘hello’ giggles from my throat to my tongue. A set of razors, tweezers and waxing strips are 
sprawled across a table to my right. Marks on his chest glow red from recent activity. We 
exchange pleasantries. He seems comfortable, certainly more so than me. I feel the weight of 
something between us – something like control, but a control that neither of us seems wholly 
able to seize and that renders us both exposed. He gestures to the table and I turn to pick up 
the tweezers. Blood prickles against the skin on my forehead and cheeks. I feel invested in 
responsibility – both for the model and myself. Another giggle. I apologise, and his grin 
widens. I swallow, approach and pluck. One hair from his left breast.  
Half Cut’s Half Cut at Theatre Souk in October 2010 was a paradoxical and risky mix 
of the trivial and the challenging that so often seems to characterise  ‘one-on-one’ theatre. 
Taking Half Cut as a case study, this article explores the political act of committing to risk as 
a single audience participant in live theatre – even if risk is only felt to be risky – and 
considers how this commitment might encourage reflection on the socio-economic anchors of 
affective responses such as embarrassment and awkwardness. I will be commenting on the 
significance of framing theatre as fit for consumption against the context of risk-taking in 
daily life, particularly in relation to the impact of recent economic turbulence felt across 
Europe and the United States. How might committing to risk destabilise both a sense of 
personal security and the perceived rationality of an economically defined power dynamic 
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operating between performer and audience? My feeling is that the relationships between risk-
taking, agency and responsibility in the theatre are much stronger than comparable practices 
outside of aesthetic space, where responsibility is side-lined in favour of obfuscation or 
excused by fatalism, and agency is rarely considered an option when the risks seem to be out 
of personal control or influence. On however small a scale, perhaps committing to risk in  
‘one-on-one’ theatre might dampen the tendency to rely on fatalism to relieve the burden of 
accountability either for our own risk-taking in daily life, or for failing to take action against 
those whose risk-taking is detrimental to economic, social, and environmental well-being.  
The popularity of theatre with an audience of one, what I am here calling  ‘one-on-
one’ theatre,1 has rocketed over the past decade – particularly so in the last couple of years – 
and is now not so much a novelty, as a staple of fringe theatre programming in the United 
Kingdom, especially in London.
2
 The Battersea Arts Centre’s (BAC) most recent One-on-
One Festival (2011) implemented a provocative marketing strategy. The online ‘brochure’ 
asked its potential consumers – I hope I use the word advisedly – to ‘Fill up on 3 delicious 
courses of intimate theatre’.3 Theatre is here pitched as fit for consumption by framing the 
                                                          
1
 Rachel Zerihan has taken issue with the opposition constructed between actor and spectator in ‘one-on-one’ 
situations, and instead felt the need to reinstate the proliferation of the term ‘one to one’ which seemed dominant 
prior to the Battersea Arts Centre’s One-on-One festivals. Just as Zerihan allied her terminology to what she was 
looking for in the work of Adrian Howells (therapy), Oreet Ashery (witnessing) and Franko B (eroticism), so do 
I ally my focus on risk and confrontation in preferring the term one-on-one. Rachel Zerihan, ‘One to One: A 
Strange Duet’, Quorum, seminar at Queen Mary, University of London (London, 16 March 2011). 
2
 Festivals, events and venues regularly programming one-on-one theatre in London which are not discussed in 
this paper include: Sprint at the Camden People’s Theatre; Stoke Newington International Airport’s Live Art 
Speed Date; SHUNT at the SHUNT Vaults in London Bridge (later Bermondsey Street and now without base); 
and The Institute of Contemporary Art. This brief list is not intended to be comprehensive.  
3
 ‘BAC One-on-One Festival: What’s Your Taste?’, Programme, (29 March – 9 April 2011) Battersea Arts 
Centre. http://www.bac.org.uk/whats-on/one-on-one-festival/ [accessed 13 April 2011], p. 1. 
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one-on-one experience as some sort of theatrical nouvelle cuisine: both bite-size and intense. 
Comparably, Theatre Souk welcomes their audience to its ‘market place’ in which a 
reasonable entry fee is charged, and a bartering system for each performance follows from 
there.
4
 This would appear to be a successful co-opting of theatre by the idealism of the 
neoliberal free-market – a trait which has recently been identified as affecting even the most 
socially engaged of art practices.
5
 Factoring in the possibility of consuming participatory 
‘risks’ for the audience, it seems pertinent to question what is being consumed and how in 
one-on-one theatre. Consequently, I have split this paper into three sections: the first looks at 
the commonplace production of risk in contemporary socio-economic space, particularly in 
the UK; the second addresses an ‘aesthetics of risk’ in the theatre and why such an aesthetics 
might be deemed significant and appropriate; the third and last section applies this aesthetics 
to Half Cut to determine how risk is produced in the moment of performance and how this 
might be understood as transgressive in relation to the production of risk operating outside of 
aesthetic space.  
Ulrich Beck’s notion of the ‘risk society’, a phenomenon that I believe has come to 
fruition over the past decade, will be borrowed to help eke out how risk is produced in 
contemporary socio-economic space. Counter to apathetic or fatalistic responses to 
commonplace risk-taking, I opt for a radical engagement with risk within the potentially 
subversive site of aesthetic space. Striving to assess one-on-one theatre’s production and 
reception within the risk society, I will draw on Hans-Thies Lehmann’s call for an ‘aesthetics 
of risk’ and weigh the politics of committing to risk in performance against the ethical 
compromise of objectifying a stranger to that end. I will pay close attention to the economic 
transaction hanging over the encounter between the hair plucking participant and potentially 
                                                          
4
 Theatre Souk, Programme, Theatredelicatessen (London, 14 Sept – 16 Oct 2010), p. 1. 
5
 See Jen Harvie, ‘Democracy and Neoliberalism in Art’s Social Turn and Roger Hiorns’s Seizure’, 
Performance Research, 16.2 (2011), pp. 113-123.  
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plucked performer in Half Cut to assess what is being consumed and how. Gender and 
sexuality may well influence what is felt to be ‘risky’ (or risqué) by a given spectator, and the 
perception of participatory ‘risks’ will be dependent on the race, sexuality and gender of 
different spectators. Consequently, I must emphasise the subjectivity of my account of Half 
Cut above. But my focus will be on an economically determined power dynamic which is 
universal to all participating spectators who go along with the theatrical contract offered to 
them: to pay money to pluck, wax, or shave a model’s hair. I will consider the weight of this 
transaction within aesthetic space as a successfully functioning framing device that might 
unravel an otherwise fetishised relationship between performer and participant. What 
interests me is how the stimulus of affectation might prompt a deeper reflection on the roles 
of agency and responsibility within the aesthetically framed risk scenario – a reflection 
exposing apathy and fatalism as unfavourable alternatives in the wider context of institutional 
and institutionalised risk-taking. 
 
The Production of Risk in the Risk Society 
There is no consensus on the etymological history of ‘risk’, but sociologists tend to agree on 
its emergence correlating to the decline of religion in Europe.
6
 Pascal’s experiments with 
probability theory in the 1650s and 1660s were emblematic of a turn in Europe away from 
                                                          
6
 See Peter L. Bernstein, Against the Gods: The Remarkable Story of Risk (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 
1996); Stephen Lyng, ‘Sociology of the Edge: Social Theory and Voluntary Risk Taking’, in Edgework: The 
Sociology of Risk-Taking, ed. by Stephen Lyng (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 17-49; Niklas Luhmann, Risk: A 
Sociological Theory, trans. Rhodes Barrett (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1993); and Gerda Reith, ‘Living with 
Risk: Chance, Luck and the Creation of Meaning in Uncertainty’, in The Aesthetics of Risk: Volume 3 of the 
SoCCAS Symposia, ed. by John Welchman (Zurich: JRP Ringier, 2008), pp. 57-78. 
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providential determinism towards Enlightenment rationalism.
7
 Statistical and logical 
inference became increasingly significant in the milieu of a European society harbouring a 
growing interest in economic incentive.
8
 It is no accident that the earliest risk assessments 
came from merchants insuring against maritime disaster shortly after the time of Pascal.
9
 Risk 
was from the outset bound up with insurance against financial loss in a world that no longer 
laid capital gain in the hands of God. Insurance against risk, as a concept and a practice, was, 
and still is, bound up with uncertainty about what the future holds. 
 Today the notion of risk is virtually omnipresent the world over. Sociologist Ulrich 
Beck earmarked the trajectory of late-twentieth century world history as crashing towards the 
‘risk society’, where a kind of ‘reflexive’ problem solving becomes dominant. Techno-
economic progress, claims Beck, is implicitly bound up with the production of risks.
10
 We 
might see global warming as a definitive case in point where a socially recognised hazard is 
produced by means of techno-economic, particularly industrial progress (where progress is 
                                                          
7
 Whilst Pascal famously formulated a ‘wager’ that belief in God is better than disbelief, the place of God in the 
research of the probability theorists that followed became increasingly insignificant. What is more, his wager 
constitutes only a small percentage of his work on probability. Pascal was among the earliest, if not the earliest, 
experimenter with probability theory. As Ian Hacking acknowledges, the Port Royal Logic (1662), of which 
Pascal was a contributor, ‘was the first to mention numerical measurements of something actually called 
“probability”’. See Ian Hacking, The Emergence of Probability: a Philosophical Study of Early Ideas about 
Probability, Induction and Statistical Inference (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 11. 
8
 Hacking, Probability, p. 8. 
9
 François Ewald claims that ‘Risk is a neologism of insurance, said to derive from the Italian word risco which 
meant “that which cuts”, hence “reef” and consequently “risk to cargo on the high seas”’. See François Ewald, 
‘Insurance and Risk’, in The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, ed, by Graham Burchell, Colin 
Gordon and Peter Miller (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991), pp. 197-210 (p. 198).  
10
 Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, trans. by Mark Ritter (Los Angeles: Sage, 1992), p.13.  
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here defined by industry).
11
 What industrial modernity procured in terms of economic and 
social progress also produced a series of risks, manifested particularly well in this example, 
which threatens not only progress, but the livelihoods of those who may or may not benefit 
from such risk production. Beck argues that modernity has consequently developed (although 
we might read this as an on-going process once modernity is read as a multiple phenomenon) 
from its industrial phase into a phase of ‘reflexivity’, or ‘reflexive modernity’, which looks to 
manage risk production.  
It is not necessary to dwell on this transition when it is already accounted for so 
succinctly in Beck’s writing. I prefer instead to focus on the notion of a ‘risk society’ in 
excess of a primarily ecological concern mapped by Beck. Terrorist attacks, the menace of 
malicious computer viruses for national security, misplaced laptops holding the data of 
countless citizens and identity theft, are just a few examples which produce a commonplace 
and toxic brew of paranoia, scaremongering and potential catastrophe that threatens to shatter 
the optimist’s rose-tinted spectacles. My tone here might well be labelled by Anthony 
Giddens, another key sociologist on the theme of risk production, as cynical pessimism.
12
 I 
would consider apathy a far graver criticism: worse still, ‘A sense of “fate”’ which ‘relieves 
the individual of the burden of engagement with an existential situation which might 
otherwise be chronically disturbing’.13  
It seems to me that the ‘chronically disturbing’ alternative to fatalism referred to by 
Giddens, an alternative that we might re-phrase as an existential queasiness to underline the 
                                                          
11
 This is a global risk, a kind which particularly interests Beck, which we might set apart from risks relating to 
specific countries or locations (one part of the world might be at risk from famine while another is at risk from 
heart-related illnesses relating to obesity – both of which we might attribute to the distribution of wealth and 
resolutions, or lack thereof, to re-define relationships to this distribution on a developing global stage). 
12
 Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press), p. 136.  
13
 Ibid., p. 133. 
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visceral component of engaging with this state, is at least partly explained by the implicit 
relation of risk, as something commonplace, to uncertainty. Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s notion 
of a ‘Black Swan’ proves informative here. Taleb describes a ‘Black Swan’ as an event which 
is an outlier (‘outside the realm of regular expectations, because nothing in the past can 
convincingly point to its possibility’), ‘carries extreme impact’, and is explained only after its 
occurrence, much like the discovery of black swans in Australia and the consequent re-
writing of ornithological text books for those in the Old World.
14
 So there would seem to be 
two broad categories of risk today: those which are future-oriented predictions of possible 
negative occurrences, and those which are, like the menacing Black Swan, entirely 
unpredictable. 
 Positioning this contextual material in relation to Half Cut in particular, and aesthetic 
space generally, it seems pertinent to underline two distinct factors that seem to be having a 
profound impact on the nurture of the risk society, and the climate in which theatre is 
produced and received in the UK today. My focus will henceforth be narrowed to the 
production of economically determined risk scenarios. Half Cut was performed in the 
aftermath of transition from a Labour government to the current UK Coalition of Liberal and 
Conservative parties. Accompanying this transition were (and still are) attempts to diminish 
both the size of the national budget deficit
15
 and pull of the economic crisis which peaked in 
2008. It is important not to confuse the two in what follows, but it is also worth stressing that 
                                                          
14
 Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: the Impact of the Highly Improbable (London: Penguin, 2007), pp. 
xvii-xviii. 
15
 According to the Office of National Statistics, net debt, as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product, has risen 
steadily from around 30% between 2001-2 to 58.0% at the end of February 2011. This figure rose particularly 
between 2008-10. See Office for National Statistics, Public Sector Finances, Great Britain (22 March 2011) 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=206 [accessed 5 April 2011]. 
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perception of one might influence perception of the other. The current cuts to Arts Council 
funding in the UK
16
 are encouraging arts organisations, theatres and theatre companies to 
strike a balance between the raising of ticket prices, encouragement of patronage, particularly 
through gift aid, and corporate advertising or product placement.
17
 The extent to which UK 
theatres, and arts venues in general, can be said to provide alternative spaces to zones of 
consumption otherwise proliferate outside of aesthetic space is diminishing. In some respects, 
the branding of the recent BAC One-on-One festival and Theatre Souk discussed earlier is a 
reflection of this.  
The production, distribution and consumption of goods was not necessarily behind the 
collapse of the global market place, but, to the author’s mind at least, the distribution and 
redistribution of production and consumption’s fuel: namely, money in the form of 
circulating loans.
18
 That the majority of UK citizens have such minimal control over the 
                                                          
16
 ‘In passing on overall government cuts of 15%’ to Arts Council England (ACE), regularly funded arts 
organisations fell foul of significant (and sometimes complete) cuts to their funding: ‘Of the 1,330 organisations 
that had applied for funding for 2012-15, 638 were disappointed. Of those, 206 had been regularly funded by 
ACE’. See Mark Brown and Charlotte Higgins, ‘Arts Council Funding: A Day of Mixed Fortunes as Cuts are 
Announced’, Guardian Online, 30 Mar 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/culture/2011/mar/30/arts-council-
funding-cuts [accessed 5 April 2011]. 
17
 A good example of this latter was the integration and branding of Courvoisier cognac in the gastronomic 
performances on offer at Coming Up festival (2010) at London Bridge’s Debut theatre. 
18
 Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs) are bundles of loans which are bought and sold on the financial 
market. My understanding of the premise is that good loans are bundled together with so-called ‘toxic loans’ – 
not necessarily by intention (an important disclaimer if I am to deter from potential libel). To buy and sell CDOs 
is to buy and sell risk. The commodification of risk is not peculiar to the twenty-first century. Derivatives, 
another example of risk being bought and sold, have been exchanged for nearly three hundred years. What set 
CDOs apart from their precursors was their complexity. Traders were not always aware just what they were 
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actions of those involved in circulating these loans is significant. This raises the question of 
agency over the risk scenarios generated by such transactions, in particular how we intend to 
position ourselves in relation to those risk scenarios. I rejected above the validity of fatalism 
or apathy as suitable responses. I wish to propose that the attributes of responsibility and 
vulnerability accompanying the choice to commit to a risk scenario in one-on-one theatre 
might provide a radical alternative for engaging with risk – particularly the risks associated 
with economic activity.  Whilst it would be difficult to justify Half Cut as directly responding 
to the economic crisis or national budget cuts, our ‘horizon of expectations’, both cultural and 
ideological, is ‘bound to interact with every aspect of the theatrical event’.19  I want to 
emphasise the impact of this backdrop on the interchanges which might take place between 
performer(s) and participating audience in one-on-one performance today, but in such a way 
that a relational understanding of that interchange might be enriched. In addition to future-
oriented predictions of possible negative occurrences and ‘Black Swan’ scenarios, there 
might be a third kind of risk opened up through artistic practice, particularly in one-on-one 
theatre.
20
 This is a kind of risk that makes little sense when phrased in terms of potential gain, 
because loss is pitched as a positive attribute – loss of self-esteem, loss of dignity, and loss of 
self-assuredness. Loss is referred to here as a politically effective tool in the risk society, if 
what is lost is lost as a product of choice. This might be considered as a ‘radical’ engagement 
with risk as it sets about subverting the roots of the concept. This is risk at odds with 
Enlightenment rationalism and the act of insuring against loss; loss might be approached 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
buying and selling. It was the degree of uncertainty regarding the risks being circulated that stoked market 
volatility. 
19
 Susan Bennett, Theatre Audiences: A Theory of Production and Reception, 2
nd
 edn (London: Routledge, 
1997), p. 99. 
20
 This does not relate to artistic practice alone, but might also refer to fetish clubs, S&M, drug taking and a host 
of other practices described by Stephen Lyng (after Hunter S. Thompson) as ‘Edgework’. See Lyng, Edge.  
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profitably as the very thing to be invested in. A pragmatically radical engagement with risk 
seems more important now than ever before: ‘although we are beset by major problems, we 
can and should mobilise either to reduce their impact or to transcend them’.21 Perhaps a good 
place to start would be to prompt an existential questioning of the influence and allure of risk 
on a personal level. It is perhaps for this reason that I find it so important to encourage risk-
taking for audiences today, so that risk is not something passively submitted to, but actively 
committed to. Unsettling audiences in such a way that they choose to risk being unsettled 
might draw attention either to a lack of choice within the risk society, nurturing a desire to 
change the circumstances which promote this lack, or highlight a reluctance to act when 
acting is an option, so that reluctance morphs into a sense of responsibility for one’s own part 
within a risk scenario. Instilling a political awareness of our capacity to manipulate 
circumstances, grounded in a sense of personal responsibility for our actions, consequently 
presents itself as an admirable motivation for participating in one-on-one theatre in the 
twenty-first century.    
 
The Aesthetics of Risk 
It is worth clarifying the difference between risk, and the perception of risk, within aesthetic 
space.
22
 In the case of the potential-plucker in Half Cut, the risks involved in participation 
                                                          
21
 Giddens, Consequences, p. 137. 
22
 I am aware of Jane Blocker’s claim that risk is ‘aestheticised’ in daily life, particularly in war time: ‘In the US 
today, the advent of reality television shows such as Fear Factor, the globalization of the economy, the diffuse 
and endless “war on terror”, and the exploding national debt, have precipitated a routine aestheticization of risk 
that engenders confusion about who is undertaking it and how its responsibilities are transferred to others’. See 
Jane Blocker, ‘Aestheticizing Risk in War Time: The SLA to Iraq’, in The Aesthetics of Risk: Volume 3 of the 
SoCCAS Symposia, ed. by John C. Welchman (Zurich: JRP Ringier, 2008), pp. 191-223 (p. 210). As I hope to 
12 
 
might be described as the uncertain affective response, or set of responses – awkwardness, 
embarrassment, discomfort, etc. – to the aesthetic stimulus of plucking a man’s hair with a 
pair of tweezers. While this kind of risk seems trivial in relation to those of Beck’s risk 
society, perception of those risks on the part of the plucker might be significant. The risk of 
pain for the potentially-plucked cannot really be called a ‘risk’, as the potentially-plucked has 
been plucked before, and is well aware of the level of pain forthcoming. Risk ceases to be 
risk when divorced from uncertainty. As Gerda Reith writes, risk ‘is defined by and through 
temporality: the notion of “risk” expresses not something that has happened or is happening, 
but something that might happen’. 23  As a future-oriented phenomenon of uncertainty, 
sometimes related to, but distinct from harm, the experience of risk in the live theatre event 
will usually be much stronger for the spectator than the artist, particularly when a given 
performance is repeated for different spectators.
24
  
A point of departure to begin unpacking this is taken from Hans-Thies Lehmann’s 
conclusion to Postdramatic Theatre: ‘In the age of rationalization, of the ideal of calculation 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
explain, the aesthetic space of the live theatre event and the co-presence of participating parties lends itself to 
remedying any such confusion. 
23
 Reith, Risk, p. 59. 
24
 This accounts for my surprise in response to the dominating application of risk as a discourse to the physical 
or psychological pain of the artist, especially the live artist. See Claire MacDonald, ed., ‘On Risk’, spec. issue of 
Performance Research, 1.2 (Summer 1996); and Welchman’s The Aesthetics of Risk. There may well be 
unanticipated (emotional) responses generated in the unique encounter with different participants, but the extent 
to which these responses might be anticipated will be much stronger for a participating audience than the artist. 
In considering risks for the artist, it makes more sense to me to consider exceptions to this rule. These include 
the employment of chance as a creative device (such as John Cage and others at the Black Mountain College in 
the 1950s), the risks of artistic failure, and committing to scenarios with multiple uncertain trajectories (such as 
the pointing of a loaded gun to the head of Marina Abramović in Rhythm 0).  
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and of the generalized rationality of the market, it falls to the theatre to deal with extremes of 
affect by means of an aesthetics of risk, extremes which always also contain the possibility of 
offending by breaking taboos’.25 I drew attention to the emergence of risk as a concept being 
bound up with handling uncertainty as a rationalistic endeavour, and yet Lehmann seems to 
argue for an ‘aesthetics of risk’ as being resistant to rationality: particularly the rationality 
propagated by the market. It seems anachronistic to pitch an aesthetics of risk against the 
system of probabilistic prediction from which risk springs. However, it also seems fair to 
downplay the onus on probability previously discussed in assessing the evolution of risk as a 
concept. Firstly, elucidating the work of Daniel Bernoulli in the early eighteenth century, 
Peter Bernstein explains how the mathematician converted ‘the process of calculating 
probabilities into a procedure for introducing subjective considerations into decisions that 
have uncertain outcomes’.26 Feeling is consequently introduced into the equation. Secondly, 
two centuries on in a post-World War world, ‘Mathematicians and philosophers had to admit 
that reality encompassed entire sets of circumstances that people had never contemplated 
before’. 27  The Black Swan rears its head as risk’s flip side to rationalism. Today, the 
normalcy of risk-taking within the risk society might encourage less focus on the probability 
of something happening, and more on the level of threat anticipated. The rational application 
of statistics might be less significant to a contemporary audience than the allure of flirting 
with threat: a commitment to risky situations that verge on the masochistic in courting 
personal insecurity. Perhaps willingly submitting to the allure of risk as a potentially 
stimulating site of pleasurable degradation
28
 is little more than another example of what 
                                                          
25
 Hans-Thies Lehmann, Postdramatic Theatre, trans. by Karen Jürs-Munby (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 187. 
26
 Bernstein, Gods, p. 105.  
27
 Ibid., p. 217.  
28
 Foucault’s notion of ‘limit experience’ and Lyng’s commentary on ‘edgework’ are both informative here. 
Such risk-taking activity might be transgressive (in the case of Foucault) or confrontational (in the case of Lyng) 
14 
 
Wouter Hillaert describes as the ‘experience industry’: a profit-making enterprise spawned 
from strip-clubs, role-play adventures and theme parks.
29
 As I hope to show with my 
Damocles metaphor below, the mechanics of the relationship between finance and 
consumption in an aesthetically framed exchange will prove vital in defending one-on-one 
theatre against this consideration.  
Lehmann describes ‘taboo’ as ‘a socially anchored form of affective reaction that 
rejects (“abjects”) certain realities, forms of behaviour or images as “untouchable”, 
disgusting or unacceptable prior to any rational judgment’.30 This resonates with my own 
encounter of Half Cut, albeit with slightly less intensity. The plucking of a single hair, as an 
act of objectification, proved unpalatable on an ethical level. Emmanuel Levinas describes 
how ‘The Other not only comes to us from a context but signifies by itself’.31 Levinas’s 
phenomenology would seem a rich resource to utilise in unpacking an ethics of the face-to-
face in Half Cut, particularly in relation to the kind of affective reaction, prior to rational 
judgment, described by Lehmann – not least for the onus placed on the responsibility housed 
in this ‘first discourse’ of the ‘face’ which signifies and appeals by itself, set apart from the 
influence of other sign systems. Levinas defines subjectivity as ‘a responsibility for others’ to 
which one is compelled, for responsibility is an implicit part of our relationship to the Other: 
a relationship which reaches deeply within the constitution of self and the nurture of self-
                                                                                                                                                                                    
as a negotiation of structurally developed normative boundaries between licit and illicit acts in a given society. 
See Lyng, Edge, pp. 40-47. There is both pleasure and a sense of agency to be found in risky thrill seeking – 
whether courting sexual taboo or skydiving – which might subvert security akin to Lehmann’s comments on 
challenging socially anchored affective responses.  
29
 Wouter Hillaert, ‘(Long) Live the Experience: Reflections on Performance, Pleasure and Perversion’, trans. 
by Lisa Wiegel, Lise Uytterhoeven and Peter M. Boenisch, in ‘Border Collisions: Contemporary Flemish 
Theatre’, spec. issue of Contemporary Theatre Review, ed. by Lourdes Orozco and Peter M. Boenisch, 20.4 
(2010), pp. 432-36 (p. 434). 
30
 Lehmann, Postdramatic Theatre, p. 184.  
31
 Emmanuel Levinas, Humanism of the Other, trans. Nidra Poller (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2003), 
p. 31. 
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expression.
32
 I recognise and support the significance of this primary appeal (an appeal 
usefully explored and developed in relation to theatre by Helena Grehan),
33
 but in defining 
the locus of affect and responsibility in the particular instance of Half Cut, particularly with 
regard to comparative risk scenarios inducing affect outside of aesthetic space, I wish to 
widen critical scope away from the singularity of the face towards the very structuring 
schemas Levinas sought to pierce through. I wish to assess how one can be held accountable 
for choice beyond such an implicit bond, by making explicit how the exercise of choosing – a 
product of agency – relates to responsibility within an economically defined exchange 
between performer and participant.  
Affect theorists are keen to underline the relational qualities of affect as something 
existing in-between subjects and subjects, or subjects and objects, without ever being fully 
subsumed within them.
34
 The apparent ephemerality and ineffability of affect, which may be 
a product of this relationality, is perhaps less significant than the visceral residues left behind 
and it is these residues that I hope to suggest might prompt conscious reflection on the 
significances attributed to a given affect by a participant.
35
 To fail to pluck the model’s hair 
in Half Cut would prove unpalatable on a socio-political level just as much as the ethical 
level of objectifying an Other: I would remain tied to taboo, in Lehmann’s sense of the term, 
unable to transgress a social boundary between two consenting human beings. I am pitching 
in tension an ethical responsibility for the Other against an egocentric, socio-political 
transgression of the social anchors of affective response in excess of Levinasian 
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responsibility. Risk-taking in quotidian space, which might include rendering oneself 
vulnerable to negative affect, might similarly objectify Others towards a given end (for 
instance, profiteering), but the transgression of socio-political boundaries are less clear when 
risk-taking is approached with complacency. In what follows, I will be testing how the 
relationships between risk, agency and responsibility might differ between aesthetic and 
quotidian spaces.   
 
The Production of Risk in Half Cut 
There is a sense of responsibility in any performance, particularly participatory performance, 
to play by the rules of an often unspoken contract between artist and audience. If a creative 
offer is made, it is the participant’s part to see where the acceptance (or denial) of that offer 
takes them. In Half Cut, this offer is brokered by the actor in his clean-cut suit – perhaps we 
might call him the ‘pluck pimp’.  Both model and ‘pluck pimp’ are male. The scenario is 
inherently phallocentric, particularly so when the ‘pluck pimp’ lays claim to ownership over 
the model, referring to him as ‘his own’ when brokering the deal. He is master over the 
spectator also. He sets the price and the spectator must choose to accept or decline the offer. 
It is the ‘pluck pimp’ who seems to benefit from the exploitation of both model and 
participant. The spectator might be craving an intimate encounter, or any other motive for 
agreeing to participate, but such ends are premised on positioning the model as object the 
moment money passes from the pocket of the participant to the hand of the ‘pluck pimp’. 
Gender and sexuality might underlie the risk scenario, but the political implications of both 
inputs, which will impinge on what is experienced as risky or compromised, are determined 
by a socio-economic relation. It is this determination of risk and its implications that pull 
focus in what follows.  
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The financial transaction seems to hang over the relationship like the Sword of 
Damocles. Much like the myth, the broker (Dionysius) is in a position of power over the 
model (the glorious court of Dionysius). Curiosity prompts the participant (Damocles) to 
have in on the action. The Sword – here represented as a sum of money – hangs by a thread 
(a horse’s hair) above the participant’s head throughout the exchange with the model. The 
promise of an engaging theatrical event is tarnished by the precarious threat of the Sword 
which binds potential plucker and model together. The omnipresent threat of the sword 
sparks in Damocles the realisation of the fearful conditions embedded within the promise of 
magnificence whilst on Dionysius’s throne. Ashamed, Damocles learns the error of his ways. 
Perhaps the Sword of Damocles marks a fitting metaphor for the embarrassing weight 
of a financial transaction fostering the objectification of another human being. Where 
gratification might be said to accompany the objectification of a prostitute, I am doubtful that 
embarrassment plays an important role in the moment of the sexual act. Embarrassment 
appears anomalous to this comparable form of objectification. But it is not this anomaly that 
distinguishes the two forms of objectification, but the modes of appearance and invisibility 
that relate to the presence of the financial transaction. I am not suggesting that embarrassment 
is an inevitable consequence of the risk scenario in Half Cut: embarrassment was induced in 
me, but it need not be induced in others of different race, class, gender and sexuality. From 
the outset, the relationship between finance and objectification dominated. It is this 
relationship that I am pitching as a constant amidst the variables of identity. Where the 
variables of identity impact on and possibly define what is perceived to be risky, the 
productive source of risk remains the same. And this source is rendered omnipresent within 
an aesthetic space which attunes attention towards recognition of an otherwise fetishised 
relation between the consumer of risk – the theatrical thrill seeker, perhaps in search of 
embarrassment as both ‘thrill’ and ‘risk’ – and the objectified model through which the 
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consumption of risk is made possible. Even if sought by intention, affect is produced by a 
visceral sense of accountability for the production of risk (blood prickling behind reddened 
cheeks): a production within which both performer and participant are caught. This one-on-
one scenario has spawned what one might misleadingly call a mode of ‘visibility’ in the 
theatre – but, of course, this is not something seen, but felt. This is more than a one-on-one 
encounter as there is an invisible third party in the room. This third party is not the pluck 
pimp, for he is next door. It is the sword held by a horse’s hair: the third point in a relational 
configuration represented by a financial transaction and rendered present through affectation.  
To borrow from Nicholas Ridout, the fetishised
36
 relationship between actor and 
paying spectator is revealed as a difficult one: ‘I have paid to have this man look at me, and 
he is paid to look. Our intimacy is always alienated’.37 What seems to be at stake in the face-
to-face is recognition of the human relationship otherwise obfuscated through the act of 
exchanging money. The wheel could be seen to return full-circle back to Levinas at this 
point, but my analytical interest remains elsewhere. Ridout describes theatre as ‘a machine 
that sets out to undo itself. It conceives itself as an apparatus for the production of affect by 
means of representation, in the expectation that the most powerful affects will be obtained at 
precisely those moments when the machinery appears to break down’. 38  In Half Cut, 
however, this economic relationship between producing actor and consuming audience is not 
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glimpsed through the failure of theatre to fully represent something, but through successfully 
representing and rerouting the objectification of the model from the box office at the door to 
Theatre Souk, to the secondary box office of the pluck pimp. This latter is situated firmly 
within the aesthetic space of the performance in such a way that there is not, as Jane Blocker 
has claimed, a confusion of responsibilities within aesthetic space.
39
 Rather, an economic 
exchange takes place both outside of, and within aesthetic space – but in the latter, the 
relationship between money and theatrical commodity is rendered direct.  
Whilst I acknowledge that content is not easily divorced from the form through which 
it appears, I would argue that it is equally important not to undermine the significant sway 
theatre form holds over the reception of that content.
40
 The one-on-one theatre form offers 
absolute centrality to what I would describe as a dialogic intimacy: an intimacy forged 
between two individuals where both have the capacity to radically influence the creative 
stimulus, as opposed to a reading of that stimulus alone. This is an intimacy that recognises, 
with Grant Kester, the danger of overlooking ‘the manifest differentials in power relations’ 
between participating subjects in artistic practice.
41
 At the same time, a possible hub 
determining the distribution of power in a given theatrical relation is pitched as being in 
excess of all participating parties; an abstract relation which is important to bring into focus. 
One means of doing this is to utilise the visceral consequences of committing to risk as a 
vehicle for recognising complicity and responsibility. This is not to detract from the agency 
afforded to ‘embodied’ spectators of theatre events experienced collectively in promenade 
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theatre or from within the protective bunker of the darkened theatre auditorium. But in one-
on-one theatre, a much simpler exchange takes place when the scenario is paired down to 
two. Both artist and participant might be open to manipulation, but the onus on personal 
responsibility for the artwork is heightened in the one-on-one scenario in which there is rarely 
an option of recourse to the (frequently, but not always) safe zone of a community of 
strangers or darkened auditorium. With one-on-one theatre comes exposure, and with 
exposure comes a degree of vulnerability. In the case of Half Cut, the economic relation 
between artist and paying participant is a difficult one – the Sword of Damocles omnipresent 
– which renders complicity in commodification overbearing. The paying participant is forced 
to face the uncompromising situation of having rendered him or herself complicit in the 
nurture of a mutual vulnerability.  
The implications of being subject to such a risk in the theatre seem to resonate against 
the milieu of the risk society. In such a milieu, agency might be side-lined for fatalism if one 
feels that the magnitude of a given risk scenario is too great to be influenced personally. 
Global warming is a pressing example. Responsibility for risks gone bad might either be 
obfuscated, or passed on to others who had no role in the taking of those risks. An example 
here would be the circulation of toxic loans. In contrast, the paradoxical and risky mix of the 
trivial and the challenging in Half Cut – a mix which I claimed was typical of one-on-one 
theatre generally – renders the triadic relationship between risk, agency and responsibility 
uncomfortably strong. The decision to accept the offer of plucking a single hair encourages a 
sense of responsibility once the creative trajectory of the risk scenario is negotiated. The 
affective responses produced by the risk scenario function more as a medium to draw out the 
Damoclesean stimulus for affectation. What emerges as significant is a sense of 
accountability. Committing to risk renders the triad ‘risk-agency-responsibility’ complete and 
holds the participant to account in their negotiation of the risk scenario. In this sense, 
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committing to risk scenarios in one-on-one theatre produces pockets of resistance that expose 
the breaks in agency and responsibility operating elsewhere in the risk society. The political 
ramifications of the seemingly trivial – the plucking of a single hair – seems to raise the 
stakes of a politics of engagement in one-on-one theatre and an aesthetics of risk forged 
through theatre form. One instance of a pragmatically radical engagement with risk might 
begin on the personal level of committing to an existential queasiness in one-on-one theatre. 
